responsible civiliter for his torts. Bagster vs. Portsmouth, 7 D. & R., 614; Weaver vs. Ward, Hob., 134; Cross vs. Andrews, Cro. Eliz., 622.

"To say that insanity exonerates a party from a forfeiture, under such a proviso in a policy, is to assume that this was the intention of the parties when the contract of insurance was entered into. But, if such was not the intention, then it follows, that the assured gave an intelligent assent to a contract by which he stipulated that, if he took his own life voluntarily knowing the consequences of his act, he would thereby work a forfeiture of his claim under the policy, although he may have acted under the influence of insanity in committing the suicidal act. So, after all, we are brought back to the enquiry, what was the intention of the parties to the contract, in order to ascertain the true construction of the proviso.

"The result to which we have come after a careful and deliberate consideration of the question, during which we have felt most sensibly the very great difficulties and embarrassments which surround the subject, is, that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover. The facts agreed by the parties, concerning the mode in which the plaintiff's intestate took his own life, leave no room for doubt that self-destruction was intended by him, he having sufficient capacity at the time to understand the nature of the act which he was about to commit, and the consequences which would result from it. Such being the fact, it is wholly immaterial to the present case that he was impelled thereto by insanity, which impaired his sense of moral responsibility and rendered him, to a certain extent, irresponsible for his actions."

Where a policy of life insurance contained a clause, providing that the policy shall be void in case the insured shall die in the known violation of any law of the State, or of the United States, or of any country which he may be permitted under this policy to visit or reside in, the company must prove, in order to avoid the policy on this ground, that he died while engaged in a voluntary criminal act, known by him at the time to be a crime against the laws of such State

or country.

But those acts, which are criminal by the common law and the laws of all civilized countries, will be presumed to be criminal by the laws of the States of this Union, and he will also be presumed to have known that they are so. Cluff vs. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 13 Allen, 308.

If, in an action upon such policy, there is evidence tending to show, that the insured was killed by being shot while engaged in the commission of a robbery, and assault and battery, and it is in dispute, whether, if he had been so engaged, he had desisted therefrom, it must appear, in order to exonerate the company from liability, that such criminal act was not so far completed as to render the shooting a new and distinct event, rather than a mere continuation of the original affray, and that the death was the consequence of the crime of the assured: but it need not be proved that the insured knew, or had reason to believe, that his criminal act would expose his life to danger. Ib.

Fifth. Of the interest of Married Women in policies of Insurance, under Statute Provisions.

A policy of insurance to a married woman, made under the laws of New York, for her benefit, and that of her children in case of her death, cannot be transferred so as to divest the interest of the wife and her children. Eadie vs. Slimmon, 26 N. Y., 9.

The court held that such a policy differed from a chose in action of a married woman, in that the provision of the statute continuing such a policy, in the event of her death, for her children's benefit, evidently looked to, and made provision for a state of widowhood and orphanage.

They held that it would be a violation of the spirit of the provision, to hold that a wife insured under this act could sell or traffic with her policy, as though it were realized personal property, or an ordinary security for money. It is, indeed, by force of the provisions of the statute of New York, in the nature of an estate-tail to the wife and her children.

If a policy of insurance on the life of a married man is made payable to his wife, and she dies before him leaving

children, the administrator of her estate, upon receiving the amount of the policy after the death of the husband, will hold it under the statutes of Massachusetts, if no other trustee is appointed, for the benefit of the children, and the administrator of the husband's estate has no interest therein. Swan vs. Snow, 11 Allen, 224. This decision was had under a statute quoted in the next case.

Action upon such a Policy by Assignee.

Upon a policy of life insurance, made payable to the assured, his executors, administrators and assigns, and assigned by him for valuable consideration with the assent of the assurers, the assignee may maintain an action at law against them, after the death of the assured, although the policy is expressed to be for the use of his wife and children, and he leaves a surviving child, and notwithstanding the statute of 1844, Ch. 82, Sec. 1, (Gen. Stat. c. 58, sec. 62). The Massachusetts statute is as follows: "A policy of insurance on the life of any person, expressed to be for the benefit of any married woman, whether procured by herself, her husband, or any other person, shall inure to her separate use and benefit and that of her children, independently of her husband or his creditors or the person effecting the same or his creditors. A trustee may be appointed by the party obtaining the policy, or if no such appointment is made, then by the judge of the probate court for the county in which the party, for whose benefit said policy is made, resides, to hold the interest of the married woman in such policy or the proceeds thereof. When a policy is effected by any person on his own life or on the life of another, expressed to be for the benefit of such other or his representatives, or a third person, the person for whose benefit it was made shall be entitled thereto against the creditors and the representatives of the person effecting the same. If the premium is paid by any person with intent to defraud his creditors, an amount equal to the premium so paid, with interest thereon, shall

inure to the benefit of his creditors." Burroughs vs. State Mutual Life Ins. Co., 97 Mass., 359.

Married Women.

The same question arose in Connecticut, in a case as follows: A policy of insurance on the life of a husband was made payable to the wife for her sole use, and in case of her death before his, to be paid to her children; there being a statute authorizing a husband to effect such an insurance, and protecting it from his creditors. The wife died before the husband. Before her death, she made an absolute assignment of the policy for a valuable consideration. Held, that her interest was contingent on her surviving her husband, and that after her death, before his, her interest was gone. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. vs. Burroughs, 34 Conn., 305.

Where the assignee had (as in that case) paid an annual premium on the policy after the assignment, it was held that he was equitably entitled to a repayment from the fund of the money so paid. The opinion of the court, by Judge Carpenter, contains a brief and clear statement of the facts; and as the question is a new one, and of interest, I will quote it, he says: "In 1850, the Connecticut Mut. Life Insurance Company issued a policy on the life of G. K. for $5,000, payable to his wife M. E. K. her executors, administrators or assigns, for her sole use, within ninety days after due notice and proof of the death of the said G. K., deducting therefrom all notes taken for premiums unpaid at that date.' The policy then provided as follows: And in case of the death of the said M. E. K. before the decease of the said G. K., the amount of said insurance shall be payable after her death, to her children for their use, or to their guardians if under age,' &c.

"On the first day of September, 1862, M. E. K. executed a paper, purporting to be an absolute assignment of said policy to J. F. B. She died on the 6th day of October, 1864, died on the 10th day of the same month, leaving one son. The insurance money is now claimed by

and her husband

the assignee on the one hand, and by the son of the assured on the other.

"The claim of the assignee must depend upon the validity of the assignment; for if the assignor, at the time of the assignment, had no assignable interest in the policy, or if she had an assignable interest which was contingent merely, and that interest has been defeated by the happening of her death before that of her husband, it seems quite clear that the assignee has no valid claim to the fund in question.

"In the case of Eadie vs. Slimmon, 26 New York, 9, a policy was issued to a married woman on the life of her husband, similar in its provisions to the one now under consideration. The statute of New York on this subject is substantially like our own. She assigned the policy during the life-time of her husband, and survived him. In a suit to which she was a party, the court held that the instrument had no assignable quality.

"If we are to adopt the doctrine of that case as the law of this State, it conclusively settles the question now before us. For the reasoning of the court seems to go so far as to hold that a policy of this description, prior to the decease of the husband is absolutely and under all circumstances unassignable by the wife. That such should be the law applicable to a policy the premiums on which were paid by the husband, certainly seems reasonable and just; while, on the other hand, if the wife paid the premiums from her own separate estate, it is difficult to suggest a reason why she should not have the same power to assign her interest in the policy that she has to assign any other chose in action belonging to her. - But, in one respect, that case is distinguishable from this. There, the contingent interest of the wife became absolute by the death of the husband during her life; here, that interest was defeated by her death during the life time of the husband. This distinction renders it unnecessary for us, to determine the principal question involved in that case. For, if it be conceded, on the one hand, that Mrs. K. had an assignable interest in the policy in question, it must be conce ded, on the other hand, that that interest was a contingent