moral rule, and transgression of civil law which is crime, and also transgression of God's law which is sin. To the personal author of the transgression we impute the intention, and term this his guilt; and when we refer to the retribution with which guilt is to be visited, we term the person to whom the guilt is imputed, responsible.

SECOND PART.

POSITIVE AUTHORITY.

I.

THE OCCASION FOR POSITIVE AUTHORITY.

PURE MORALITY contemplates character and conduct solely in the light of the ultimate Rule of highest worthiness, and approves of only such character and conduct as stands conformed to that rule. This is the highest good and the only motive to right action, and can admit of no other motive in co-action with it. If other than the end of highest worthiness blend in the conduct, the life is not purely virtuous.

But specific occasions occur which make other ends desirable, and thus other motives necessary. The pure love of the right may not be always sufficient to induce obedience, and yet good reasons exist why even an obedience that is not purely virtuous must be sought. It may also be found that there are susceptibilities in human nature which may admit of the application of other motives, than the moral Rule of right seen in the case

itself, and making another end than that of pure worthiness necessary to the moral agent, in the absence of all opportunity for applying such pure end of worthiness, and thus another measure of control over human character and life may be introduced. Pure Morality, in the contemplation of such occasions, will not be sufficient to cover all the methods of dealing with human conduct, and thus other systems of motives must be found and classified which do not direct themselves immediately to the end of highest worthiness, and thereby other rules of human action must be attained than the ultimate rule of pure morality.

But no such motives may be applied and no such rules adopted, contrary to the claims of pure morality. The governing of the life by them must not conflict with the end of highest worthiness, inasmuch as such a supposition would make the system of government over human conduct immoral. The author and executor of such an administration would himself be vicious, and no possible end could be a compensation for violating and subverting the end of morality. This supposed change of rule and end, must not, therefore, conflict with and destroy the end of pure morality, but be wholly consistent with it. Such occasion is found, and the necessity for such restrictions, in the end of social polity, and the end of religious regulation, each of which must come under the constraint of direct positive authority, and cannot be left to the motives which pure morality alone may apply.

And it is precisely in the above view, that while authority is another mode of constraining human conduct

than pure morality, yet inasmuch as it may by no means contradict or subvert morality, but must in some way be made conformable to morality, its consideration must therefore be brought within the field of Moral Science. The ultimate Rule of right must be so applied to all authority, that it may thereby be determined that it is not an immoral and vicious authority. It is introduced as a necessary means of constraint where pure morality and for will not admit of an application; but in no case, no reason, may it be used in conflict with morality; and hence the necessity of subjecting all authority to the criterion of a rigid Moral Science, by which only can it be known that it is nothing but righteous authority that has been tolerated. Positive authority, thus, must come within the field of a pure moral science. It will not govern by morality, but it must govern in full accordance with morality.

II.

THE PECULIARITY OF AUTHORITY.

AUTHORITY, as brought within the province of Moral Science, is a right to legislate. When this right goes out in specific exercise, and promulgates its precepts without revealing its own reasons, guarding those precepts by the sanction of pains and penalties, and judging of conduct under its laws, and executing its penalties as incurred without giving an account of its own grounds of on to its subjects, it is termed Positive Authority. point in which this authority is vested is termed

Sovereignty. The same point of sovereignty is the source for all authoritative legislation, judicial decision and executive action in the government.

The ultimate Rule in pure morality is wholly subjecI tive. All must be brought to the decision of the reason - and the test of conscience. The inward consciousness of the excellency of spiritual being, controlling for its own worthiness' sake, is the one constraining force of all duty. But authority is in this wholly peculiar. It is entirely objective. Another than myself, and who is wholly out of and separate from myself, gives the rule and holds me responsible to him in my conduct. I need only to know the rule, and not at all his reason for giving it, and I am at once bound by it. It is not at all what my reason apprehends, but what my sovereign promulgates; not how do I decide, but solely how do I read; the proclaimed will of sovereignty alone takes hold of my conscience and binds my conduct. That which is wholly out of me is made to have dominion over all that originates within me, and the will of another is to be the lord over my will.

Such a claim always demands and should ever receive. the closest scrutiny, for unless the authority be fully legitimated in its morality, it becomes the most vicious and detestable tyranny. This is the whole business of this Second Part of Moral Science, and that to which we now betake ourselves.

Positive Authority, as already found, has varied modes of applying its constraint to human conduct, and thus giving necessity to consider it, in its different modes,