Pendill to incur expense in collecting the note, according to the interpretation urged by counsel for the complainant. The bill will therefore be dismissed, with costs of both courts. MONTGOMERY and MOORE, JJ., concurred. LONG, C. J., and GRANT, J., did not sit. paying to said party of the first part the full price at which lots may have been sold prior to this date, or may be negotiated for sale hereafter, as aforesaid, said party of the first part agrees to make deeds thereof to said parties of the second part, or to such persons negotiating for the purchase of said lots, at the request of said parties of the second part, as desired, and also agrees to credit the amount so received upon the amount that is to be paid by the parties of the second part in order to entitle them to a further agreement of purchase of the said land as aforesaid. It is further understood and agreed that the aforesaid Merwin E. Asire shall assign to the said party of the first part a note which he holds against the said Charles H. Kelsey for $800, which, when paid, shall be credited by the said party of the first part upon the sum so to be paid as the consideration for a new contract of purchase as aforesaid of the entire property as aforesaid, but the said note is not to be received itself as such payment, until the money shall be paid thereon; it being understood that no such partial payments, whether from lots or the note aforesaid, shall entitle the parties of the second part to such new contract of purchase of the entire property as aforesaid, unless the full amount that would have been due on December 1, 1894, to said party of the first part, under the old contract of September 8, 1892, if kept in force, shall be paid on or before December 1, 1894. In witness whereof, the said parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written. Executed in duplicate. JAMES PENDILL. [SEAL] 109 340 119 682 109 340 s67NW 333 133 163 KINGSLEY v. TOWNSHIP OF BLOOMINGDALE. NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE ABSENCE OF RAILINGS FROM BRIDGE. Plaintiff, after safely crossing a bridge in defendant township, stopped to converse with a neighbor. His horse got the checkrein over one of the thills, began backing, and, disregarding both command and whip, backed the vehicle upon and off from the bridge. Held, that the absence of railings, conceding that it was the duty of the township to provide them, was not the proximate cause of the accident. Error to Van Buren; Buck, J. Submitted April 21, 1896. Decided May 19, 1896. Case by Floyd Kingsley against the township of Bloomingdale for personal injuries. From a judgment for defendant on verdict directed by the court, plaintiff brings Affirmed. error. A. Lynn Free and T. J. Cavanaugh, for appellant. HOOKER, J. In this cause the plaintiff appeals from a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, a township, which was charged with the duty of maintaining a bridge. The plaintiff's testimony shows that the bridge was 16 feet long, and was made of plank 14 feet long, laid upon stringers, and the bank joined the bridge at an elevation of about 3 feet above the bottom of the ditch which the bridge crossed. He had safely crossed the bridge far enough to bring the back wheels of his carriage 8 feet or more from the bridge, where he stopped several minutes, in conversation with a neighbor. His horse got the checkrein over the thill, and began backing, and, disregarding both command and whip, backed the vehicle upon and off from the bridge. It is claimed that the township was negligent in not providing a railing to the bridge. We have held, in some cases, that circumstances might require railings, but in no case have we gone so far as to hold that a highway or bridge required fencing, except in cases of obvious danger. If, however, this is a proper question to leave to the jury, in ordinary cases, it appears in this case that the horse was not frightened or caused to back by any act or neglect of the township. It was caused by the checkrein pulling upon the horse, apparently leading him to think he was expected to back, and effectually taking the control of the horse from the master, so far as the guidance was concerned. Blows even did not affect him, and it is apparent that the lack of railings was not the proximate cause of the accident, but, if a cause at all, was the remote cause. This question has been before the court several times, and need not be again discussed. It seems closely analogous to the cases of Beall v. Athens Tp., 81 Mich. 536, and St. Clair Mineral Springs Co. v. City of St. Clair, 96 Mich. 463. The judgment will therefore be affirmed. GRANT, MONTGOMERY, and MOORE, JJ., concurred. LONG, C. J., did not sit. 109 342 j146 252 GRUNST v. CHICAGO & WEST MICHIGAN RAILWAY CO. RAILROAD COMPANIES-NEGLIGENCE-ACCIDENT TO TRESPASSER. The fact that the plaintiff, a yardmaster of a railroad company, was permitted by the defendant company to visit its yard for the purpose of ascertaining whether there were cars there for his road, is no evidence that he was invited to facilitate his examination by riding on the side ladders of defendant's trains, and, in assuming such a position without invitation, he became a trespasser, and is precluded from recovering for injuries sustained, while so riding, by being struck by an arm of a switch alleged to have been placed too near the track. Error to Wayne; Frazer, J. Submitted April 21, 1896. Decided May 19, 1896. Case by August Grunst against the Chicago & West Michigan Railway Company for personal injuries. From a judgment for defendant on verdict directed by the court, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. Brooke & Spalding, for appellant. William Alden Smith and Frederick W. Stevens, for appellee. MONTGOMERY, J. Plaintiff was a railroad man of several years' experience, and for eight months prior to February 26, 1891, was employed by the Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway Company as yardmaster at Grand Haven. His duties compelled him to attend to the switching of freight cars, to bring them to the freight house, to load boats, to receive freight cars from the defendant company to his own, and to deliver cars from his own company to the defendant company. For the performance of these duties he had in his charge and under his direction a switching engine and crew. Evidence on the part of the plaintiff tended to show that the defendant had no regular switching engine at this point, but such switching as was done was performed by its local freight crew; so that frequently, in order to get cars destined for his road, plaintiff would go with his switch engine and crew over upon the defendant's track, and get the cars out himself. Plaintiff received notice of the arrival of freight cars upon defendant's track in various ways, -sometimes from his own freight agent; sometimes from defendant's local agent; sometimes from Kennedy, an employé of defendant; sometimes he would go over to defendant's yard, and find such cars himself. No objection was ever made by defendant's local agent to plaintiff's method of obtaining this information. On February 26th, plaintiff and his crew were engaged in loading a boat for Milwaukee, and late in the afternoon he sent his crew to supper, telling them to report later, to finish loading the boat. Plaintiff desired to know if there were any cars for the Milwaukee boat in defendant's yard, and jumped upon the side ladder of a passing freight train, and rode towards the switch where he was accustomed to find such cars. None of the crew of defendant's train knew of the plaintiff's presence on the side ladder. Plaintiff had nearly reached his destination when he was struck in the head by an arm of a switch which the train passed, thrown to the track and run over, and so seriously injured that it became necessary to amputate his arm and a portion of his foot. Evidence was also introduced tending to show that, two years previously, one Mahan, an employé of defendant, had warned another employé of the danger of this particular switch, the arm of which, when thrown over, projected to within a foot of passing trains. Mahan also testified that he had reported the matter to defendant's section foreman, but that nothing was done to change it. It was the contention of defendant that plaintiff was a trespasser; that he rode without the knowledge or permission of the train crew; that he was not employed by the defendant in any capacity, and |