by a later portion of the charge, in which the court said to the jury:

"Persons operating mills propelled by steam power are not insurers of property situated about the mill. All they are required to do is to use ordinary care to protect such property from being destroyed or damaged."

Exception is taken to an instruction that

"If defendants were guilty of negligence in operating their mill, and the burning of the plaintiff's property was occasioned thereby, they are liable to the plaintiff, if she was without fault, for the result of the injury to her, if such injury was the result of a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to make a natural whole, and flowed naturally from such negligence; and this even if they could not have foreseen or anticipated such injury."

Defendants' counsel construe this as being equivalent to saying that the defendants might be liable, even if it was impossible for them to have foreseen or anticipated that any injury might result in consequence of their operating the mill in the manner in which they did. We do not so construe the language. It was intended to give the jury to understand that, even though the negligence of defendants did not, in the first instance, cause plaintiff's property to take fire, yet, if it ultimately did take fire as a result of defendants' negligence, she was entitled to recover. The jury could not well have misinterpreted the language, and, in view of other portions of the charge, could not have been misled.

The defendants also assign error on the refusal of certain of their requests. In so far as they are not inconsistent with the views herein expressed, they are fairly covered by the charge of the court as given. The case was carefully tried, and no error is discovered.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

The other Justices concurred.

ATWELL v. BARNES.

DRAINS-ASSESSMENT FOR BENEFITS INJUNCTION.

Equity will not enjoin the collection of a tax assessed to defray the expense of extending and improving a drain, on the ground of the illegality of the proceedings for the improvement, at the suit of one who has stood by and permitted the work to go on, knowing that those who did the work could be compensated in no other way than by an assessment for benefits, and that his land was to be assessed therefor, and who is in fact benefited by the improvement made.

Appeal from Lenawee; Lane, J. Submitted March 9, 1896. Decided March 24, 1896.

Bill by Conrad Atwell against Henry F. Barnes, drain commissioner of Lenawee county, and another, to enjoin the collection of a drain tax assessed against complainant's land. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

A. L. Millard, for complainant.

Westerman & Westerman, for defendants.

MONTGOMERY, J. This is a bill filed to set aside proceedings for deepening and widening and extending a drain, and to restrain the collection of a tax levied against the land of the complainant to pay for the same.

It appears from the complainant's testimony that he appeared before the probate judge, and took part in the selection of commissioners, and subsequently signed bonds on an appeal to the township board taken by one of his neighbors, and that he (complainant) also appeared before the board, and complained of the amount of his assessment, and that the board cut it down somewhat. From this on, complainant did nothing until the work

was completed and the benefits to his property had been realized, and then filed the present bill. We think the bill was properly dismissed, under Byram v. City of Detroit, 50 Mich. 56; Lundbom v. City of Manistee, 93 Mich. 170; Goodwillie v. City of Detroit, 103 Mich. 283. Complainant's counsel contends that the defects in the proceeding are jurisdictional. Where this is the case, no waiver can cut off the rights of the party, or interfere with his right to complain. We need not determine what would be the right of complainant at law. The cases above cited do not turn on the principle of waiver, but hold that where a party stands by and sees work of this kind go on, with full knowledge that he is to be assessed therefor, and knowing that those who do the work can be compensated in no other way than by an assessment for benefits, and when, as in the present case, the complaining party actually receives a benefit from such work, equity will not interpose to relieve him.

It is suggested that there is no issue of waiver, but, as before stated, the question is one of remedy, and the answer contains a demurrer clause.

Decree affirmed.

The other Justices concurred.

CITY OF DETROIT v. WAYNE CIRCUIT JUDGE,

JUDGMENT-SAVING OF INTEREST.

The Supreme Court, having set aside a judgment entered nunc pro tunc, will not modify its order so as to allow the judgment to stand as of the date actually entered, for the sake of saving to the party his interest upon the judgment, inasmuch as interest may be saved in the entry of a new judgment.

Mandamus by the city of Detroit to compel Joseph W. Donovan, circuit judge of Wayne county, to vacate a judgment against the relator. On motion to modify an order granting the writ. Submitted and denied March 24, 1896.

B. T. Prentis, for the motion.

John J. Speed, contra.

PER CURIAM. On motion, a judgment which was entered nunc pro tunc against relator in the Wayne circuit court was set aside by this court on February 26, 1896. A motion is now made to modify this order, and to allow the judgment to stand as of the date it was actually entered.

The claim is made that, unless this be allowed, the plaintiff in the case will lose his interest on the judgment from the date of the verdict to the time of the entry of the judgment. We see no difficulty in the saving of the interest in the entry of a new judgment.

The motion must be denied.

FILLMORE v. GREAT CAMP, KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES.

1. MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS-CLAIM FOR BENEFITS-PROOFS of Death-WAIVER.

Where a mutual benefit association has expressly waived
the right to require that the beneficiary in the certificate of in-
surance shall submit proofs of death in the form prescribed
by the regulations of the association, it cannot subsequently
demand that such proofs be furnished as a prerequisite to a
consideration of the claim.

2. SAME-ENFORCEMENT OF CLAIM-DUTY OF BENEFICIARY.
The beneficiary in a certificate of insurance issued by a
mutual benefit association must, in the absence of fraud or
oppression on the part of the association and its officers, ex-
haust the remedy prescribed by the charter and by-laws, before
resort can be had, if at all, to the civil courts.

Petition by Catherine M. Fillmore for leave to file a bill of review in her suit against the Great Camp of the Knights of the Maccabees for Michigan, and others, reported in 103 Mich. 437. Submitted January 7, 1896. Denied March 31, 1896.

Thompson, Harriman & Thompson, for petitioner.
McDonell & Hall, for defendants.

GRANT, J. The essential facts in this case will be found in 103 Mich. 437. After the rendition of that decision, complainant paid the costs of the suit, and presented her claim to the executive committee of the great camp. In presenting this claim, she stated, through her attorneys, that proofs of death were waived by the executive committee under date of July, 1893. The committee replied to this that no consideration could be given to the alleged claim unless proofs of death were submitted in the usual way and on the blanks prescribed by the