Clementson, in his work on Special Verdicts, page 95, says: "Errors in giving or refusing instructions may be cured by the jury's findings without which the effect of the court's action would not be known and would be presumptively prejudicial. Judgments will not be reversed, notwithstanding an erroneous instruction, if from the jury's findings it affirmatively appears that the verdict was not reached upon the facts to which the instructions applied, or that the instruction was without influence. So, if the answers show that correct instructions which were refused could not have changed the verdict, the error is harmless." In Worley v. Moore, 97 Ind. 21, the court says: "In the case before us, however, it affirmatively appears that the jury were not misled or influenced by the objectionable part of the instruction. To an interrogatory as to how the mistake in the amount of appellees' indebtedness occurred, they (the jury) answered that it was by a mistake in the computation of the interest upon the notes and accounts. A judg ment will not be reversed upon an erroneous instruction, when it thus appears that the jury was not influenced by it." In Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 491 (15 N. E. 361, 4 Am. St. Rep. 548), the court says: "The finding of this special verdict renders immaterial such portions of the charge to the jury as were not calculated to induce the particular finding upon the subject involved in the instruction." In Marcott v. Marq. H. & O. R. R., 49 Mich. 103 (13 N. W. 376), Justice COOLEY says. "A similar charge was given in respect to the want of air-brakes on the train; but, as the jury, expressly found that the accident was not attributable to the want of air-brakes, all that the judge said on that subject became immaterial." In Keairnes v. Durst, 110 Iowa, 121 (81 N. W. 240), the court says: "The jury was charged that the burden was on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the setoff pleaded in the answer, and that, if he had failed to do so, the findings should be for the plaintiff. The defendant justly complains of this, for the reason that the setoff consisted of judgments which were admitted, and of which proof was not required, but the error was without prejudice, as the jury found specially that the judgments had been paid, and that necessarily included a finding that they had existed." See, also, to the same effect, Clark v. Ralls, 71 Iowa, 189 (32 N. W. 327); Walker v. Wickens, 49 Kan. 42; Daly v. City of Milwaukee, 103 Wis. 588 (79 N. W. 752). It is clear, upon both authority and reason, that when the court gives an erroneous charge or refuses to give a correct one, on a state of facts in the case, and the jury returns a special finding that shows that the facts on which the court charged, or refused to charge, had no existence, the special finding of the jury cures or renders harmless the error of the court. We hold that the error of the court in giving the charge above set out, and in refusing to give the instruction requested, as stated, supra, was rendered harmless by the special finding of the jury. We have examined the instructions given to the jury carefully, and also the charges requested by the defendant and refused by the court, and we find that, with the exceptions above specified, the instructions given, taken and construed as a whole, were fair to the defendant and submitted the case to the jury properly. The points covered by the charges requested by the defendant, with the exception noted, supra, were substantially covered by the instructions given. When the instructions were given, Mr. Dillard, attorney for "We recognize the fact that your honor's instruc- We find no reversible error in the record, and the Argued January 14, decided February 3, rehearing denied April 7, MCFARLAND v. OREGON ELECTRIC RY. CO. Exceptions, Bill of Requisites in General. 1. A formal statement in typewriting of the exceptions taken during the trial of the case to the rulings and instructions, comprising 23 pages, certified by the judge in the usual manner, attached to an exhibit containing all the evidence, and a statement that the bill of exceptions was settled and allowed at a certain date, complies with the rules of the Supreme Court. Exceptions, Bill of Requisites-Transcript of Testimony. 2. A transcript certified to be a full, true and impartial transcript of the stenographer's notes, and to constitute all of the testimony offered on the hearing, to the inside of the front cover of which is riveted the bill of exceptions, is sufficiently identified and attached to the bill of exceptions to make it a part thereof. Appeal and Error-Record-Scope and Contents-Exhibits. 3. Blue-prints marked "Defendant's Exhibit," and numbered, bear- ing no indication that they were filed with the clerk of the trial court or identified as having been received in evidence, will be disregarded Exceptions, Bill of Requisites-Reference to Transcript. 4. A reference in the bill of exceptions to the transcript of the evidence as an "abstract," not being misleading, does not affect the sufficiency of the record. Master and Servant—Damages—Loss of Comfort and Society. 5. Under Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 16) Section 1, requiring persons or corporations engaged in the manufacture, transmission, or use of electricity to use every precaution practicable for the safety of employees, and Section 4, providing that, if there shall be any loss of life by reason of the neglect of provisions of the act by any person liable thereunder, the widow, lineal heirs, or adopted children, or husband, mother or father, as the case may be, shall have a right of action, without any limit as to the amount of damages, while the beneficiary may recover any money loss, including the value of services during minority and the benefits reasonably to be expected therefrom, there can be no recovery for loss of comfort, society and protection of the decedent. [As to the principle that defendant is not liable for all possible consequences of wrongful act, see note in 36 Am. St. Rep. 811. As to measure of damage for causing death of human being, see note in 12 Am. St. Rep. 375.] Death-Actions for Causing Death-Statutory Provisions. 6. The Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 17) Section 4, giving a right of action for death caused by violation of the act to the widow, lineal heirs or adopted children, husband, mother or father, as the case may be, and Section 7, repealing all acts or parts of acts inconsistent therewith, does not repeal Section 34, L. O. L., authorizing a father or, in case of his death or desertion of the family, the mother to maintain an action for injury to or death of a child, and a guardian for injury to or death of his ward, or Section 380, empowering an executor or administrator to maintain an action for death caused by a negligent act or omission. [As to who is "dependent" within statute giving right of action for death by wrongful act to persons dependent on deceased, see note in Ann. Cas. 1912B, 733.] Master and Servant visions. Actions for Causing Death Statutory Pro 7. The Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 17), Section 4, giving a right of action for death caused by violation of the act, is remedial, and as far as possible, ought to be construed liberally in favor of the beneficiaries. Death-Actions for Causing Death-Statutory Provisions. 8. The recovery of damages for death by wrongful act exists solely by statute, and the compensation which may be recovered is limited by the enactment creating the right. [As to actions to recover damages for the wrongful causing of death, see notes in 48 Am. Dec. 632; 70 Am. St. Rep. 669.] Master and Servant-Actions for Causing Death-Persons Entitled to Sue. 9. Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 17), Section 4, giving a right of action for death caused by violation of the act to "the widow of the person so killed, his lineal heirs or adopted children, or the husband, mother, or father, as the case may be," gives damages to the persons specified in the order stated, and the father of decedent cannot maintain the action where he left his mother surviving. Death-Persons Entitled Statutory Provisions. 10. So much of Section 7349, L. O. L., providing for the descent and distribution of personal property is impliedly repealed as conflicts with Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 17), Section 4, giving a right of action to the widow, etc., of a person killed by violation of the act, and Section 7, repealing all acts or parts of acts inconsistent therewith. From Multnomah: WILLIAM N. GATENS, Judge. Department 1. Statement by MR. JUSTICE MOORE. This is an action by L. B. McFarland against the Oregon Electric Railway Company, a corporation, to recover $50,000 as damages, resulting from the death of his son, Neal J. McFarland, alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence in failing properly to guard electric wires at a substation, in consequence of which the deceased, an employee of the defendant, received a shock October 7, 1912, causing instantaneous death at the age of 19 years, 7 months, and 25 days. From a judgment in plaintiff's favor for $7,500, the defendant appeals. REVERSED: REHEARING Denied. For appellant there was a brief over the names of Messrs. Carey & Kerr, Mr. Omar C. Spencer and Messrs. Griffith, Leiter & Allen, with an oral argument by Mr. Harrison Allen. For respondent there was a brief with oral arguments by Mr. Will R. King and Mr. Lotus L. Langley. MR. JUSTICE MOORE delivered the opinion of the court. 1. As a preliminary matter it is maintained by plaintiff's counsel that a review of the errors attempted to be assigned should not be undertaken. The formal statement in typewriting of the exceptions taken by |