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No. 3.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

[Telegram.)

FEBRUARY 21, 1882. The President and the Department have been hoping that you would report progress by cable. You may assent to a liberal war indemnity which is not unjust. The cession of Tarapaca cannot be assented to without first cabling here for further instructions. If Chili should insist upon the cession, it is not impossible that the creditors of Peru may maintain that its revenues are hypothecated to them. The President urges moderation on the part of Chili.

No. 4.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

No. 7.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, February 24, 1882. SIR: I have received your No. 1 of the 13th ultimo, announcing your arrival at Santiago, and the opening of negotiations with the Chilian Government. Before answering this dispatch it will be convenient to repeat the substance of the telegrams between you and the Department since the 1st of January, to make sure that they have been properly received.

On the 3d of January I telegraphed you to exert a pacific influence, avoiding any issue which night lead to your withdrawal from Chili. This was sent direct in cipher.

On the 4th of January I telegrapbed you, to the care of the American consul at Panama, to be forwarded thence by the mail leaving that day, that the President desired to extend his friendly offices, impartially and alike, to both countries, and I again directed you to exert a pacific influence, and to avoid issues leading to offense.

Being myself in negotiation with Mr. Martinez, I informed you that the Calderon affair and its surroundings would be attended to here, and I told you that we preferred that when you came home you should not return by way of Buenos Ayres.

It was nearly three weeks before we heard from you, during which time I assume that you were occupied in carrying out your instructions as modified by my telegrams. In the evening of the 23d of January I received a cable from you, the main part of which was easily decipherable; some parts, however, were more difficult. As rendered, it informed the Department that all intention of offending by the removal of Calderon was disclaimed; that our good offices were accepted, and would facilitate conferences with the Peruvian Government, with the exception of Calderon; and that Chili was prepared to make peace on the condition of the cession of Tarapaca, and payment of $20,000,000 within ten years, Arica to be occupied until payment, and to be ceded to Chili in case of default in payment, the guano at Lobos to be appropriated by Chili. In case Peru should refuse peace on these conditions the United States were not to interfere further. You further stated in this telegram that your instructions did

not authorize you to offer the good offices of the United States on these conditions, and suggested that I should instruct you not to interfere on these conditions; that you might recognize the necessity of ceding Tarapaca, but if these modifications could not be obtained, I should instruct you to carry out your instruction No. 2.

As I have before remarked, it took some time to decipher this dispatch. On the 26th of January I received from you another cable informing me that the Chilian minister for foreign affairs was of opinion that General Kilpatrick's dispatches and instructions should not be published. Before the receipt of that cable both houses of Congress had called for all the correspondence relating to Chili and Peru, and all had been prepared and sent in response to the call.

On the 2d February you cabled me that it was desirable that I should reply to your telegram of the 23d, and I did so on the 4th of February. I said that this government proposed ouly to give counsel and to aid in negotiations, and that Chili must determine for herself whether it was wise to listen to such counsel. I reiterated the substance of the former instructions of the President that the United States would not take part in negotiations which are based upon both the surrender of Tarapaca and the payment of $20,000,0:10. I told you that the demand was looked upon as exorbitant, and that it was thought that the time had come when Chili might be magnanimous and just. Again, on the 21st instant, I telegraphed you that the President and the Department had been hoping that you would report progress by cable. I instructed you that a liberal war indemnity which was not unjust would be assented to by this government, but that the cession of Tarapaca could not be assented to unless you should first cable here for further instructions, and I told you that if Chili should insist upon that cession it was not impossible that the creditors of Peru would maintain that its revenue was hypothecated to them. I further instructed you that the President urges moderation on the part of Chili. Since then I have received nothing from you until your No. 1 arrived a few days since.

My telegrams, if they bave reached you in an unmutilated form, will have possessed you of the substance of the President's wishes in this matter. He is very desirous of having the good offices of the United States made available for the restoration of peace; but he is not willing to become the medium for a proposal, which, in bis judgment, is so oner: ous that it cannot be entertained by Peru. He is still of the opinion that it would be the part of far-sighted wisdom in Chili to accept from Peru the payment of a just indemnity in money, guaranteed, if insisted on, by temporary occupation of territory rather than peremptorily to de mand cession of territory.

On the other hand, he remains convinced that the United States has no right which is conferred either by treaty stipulations or by public law to impose upou the belligerents, upasked, its views of a just settlement, and it has no interests at stake commensurate with the evilss that might follow an interference, which would authorize it to interpose between these parties, further than warranted by treaties, by public law, or by the voluntary acts of both parties.

If Chili is indisposed to listen to friendly advice on this point, the President, as my cable has already informed you, will not take part in negotiations which are based upon both the surrender of Tarapaca and the payment of a large indemnity.

To demand of Peru the surrender of the valuable province and the payment of $20,000,000 in ten years, with a disorganized government,

provinces in anarchy, and a despoiled territory, is to ask for that which Peru in all probability cannot render.

The President cannot permit this government to be a party to such a demand. If there is to be no modification in those terms, it will be the part of wisdom in Chili to carefully consider to what the refusal may lead. The President feels that you may, without impropriety, frankly, but in a friendly, spirit, bring some of these considerations before the minister of foreign affairs in your conversations with him.

At present, it is understood that the whole of Peru, west of the main chain of the Andes, is in the occupation of Chili, and that the care and expense of maintaining government, of preserving society, and of enforcing order, is thrown upon the armed hostile occupiers. The reprerentatives of Chili are at pains to show us that not only has all pretense of a military opposition disappeared, but that all governmental organization is dissolved, and that the Chilian bayonet is all that saves Peru from anarchy.

Admitting this to be so, one of four things must follow :
First. That the armed occupation is to be permanent; or
Second. That the invader is to be driven out by force; or

Third. That Chili will withdraw, retaining so much of Peru as it desires and leaving the rest to its fate; or

Fourth. That an honorable peace will be made, leaving to Peru a government and a name.

Chili can hardly desire the first of these alternatives, with the questions that are sure to follow between it and the creditors of Peru.

To the second, it will undoubtedly answer that it can never take place; but it will be well to recall events that have taken place in the history of these two powers which tend to show that even the apparently impossible does occur.

The third alternative seems to me impracticable. If it were practicable, Chili could not justify herself before the world; and in any event should it eventuate in the occupation and absorption, without the assent of Peru, of territory whose productions are pledged to creditors of that power, this could not be done without raising grave questions in the future of Chili which the United States, as a friend of that energetic and industrious people, would wish to have avoided.

The fourth alternative is, in the opinion of the President, the wisest and safest course. He is anxious, for many palpable reasons, that it should be brought about through the peaceful influences which the Constitution intrusts to the Executive.

The traditional attidude of the United States toward the sister republies of this continent is one of peace and friendly counsel.

When as colonies they threw off their political connection with Europe, we encouraged them by our sympathies. By the moral weight of our official declarations we prerented intervention either to restore old political connections with Europe, or to create new ones. The policy we then arlopted has been since maintained. While we would draw them nearer to us by bonds of mutual interest and friendly feeling, our sole political connection springs from the desire that they should be prosperous and happy under the republican form of government which they and we have chosen. We aim to be regarded as a disinterested friend and counselor, but we do not assume to impose our wishes upon them, or to act as arbitrator or umpire in their disputes, unless moved to it by the wish of both parties, or by controlling interests of our own.

Restraining our action within this sphere, the President desires you to continue to urge upon Chili, both by the arguments suggested in this

instruction and by such other pertinent arguments not inconsistent therewith as may occur to you from your knowledge of the subject, the wisdom and justice of making peace without the acquisition of Tarapaca, unless the province should eventually become Chilian through the inability of Peru to pay a reasonable war indemnity to be agreed upon.

The President does not presume to indicate what that indemnity should be; but he leaves a discretion with you to assent to the tender of the good offices of the United States to Peru on the basis of a very liberal indemnity to Chili, if Peruvian territory is spared. If Chili in sists on retaining any of the territory whose products are or may be claimed by creditors of Peru as mortgaged or hypothecated, or in any other way made the basis of a loan, the President is not willing to in volve the United States in the complications which might ensue. He prefers to reserve to this.government the full right to determine what its action shall be, should such complications hereafter arise. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

FRED'K T. FRELINGHUYSEN.

No. 5.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram, received February 25, 1882. ]

The terms of peace will not be modified by Chili. She alleges that in deference to the United States they are better than the terms offered at Lima and at Arica. The terms are extreme, but Chili is in fact so strong and Peru is so crippled that mere friendly intervention will not have effect. I ask that definite instructions may be sent by cable at once, telling me what to say and to do; I think there is no use in my remaining here; shall I go to Peru and to Bolivia? Shall Blaine remam or return ?

No. 6.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

[Telegram.]

MARCH 1, 1882. It is preferred that you and Mr. Blaine should remain for the present. From time to time you can report the situation, losing no opportunity to carry out the President's views as already indicated to you.

No. 7.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram, received March 5, 1882.]

I have carried out your instructions scrupulously. The terms of peace will not be modified by Chili. The publication of the instructions

to me and of my confidential telegram has made it impossible to secure a modification. I will stay as directed, but I think that, with the information which I have, I can be more useful at Washington than here. Do you wish any communication of the intentions of the United States to Peru or Bolivia ?

No. 8.

Mr. Trescot to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

[Telegram.]

MARCH 15, 1882. I have had a full and friendly interview with the minister of foreign affairs. As the result I think the condition of affairs requires my presence in Peru; Blaine will go to Bolivia, and after conferring with Adams will proceed thence to join me in Peru if you do not object. It is essential to have trustworthy information from both places. You need feel no fear that I shall depart from your instructions. Please cable immediately.

No. 91

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Trescot.

[Telegram.]

MARCH 16, 1882. Your suggestion by cable is approved. The consul at Valparaiso can be left in charge, and tell him to take the archives in his custody.

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