the time limited after the time that the commencement of it shall have ceased to be so prevented.

INSOLVENCY.

Any debtor imprisoned, or liable to be imprisoned, for debt, may make application to any judge of the supreme court, or judge of the circuit court, or justice or clerk of the county court of the county in which he may be, offering to deliver, to the use of his creditors, all his property, (wearing apparel for himself and family excepted,) and praying to be permitted to take the benefit of the act for the relief of insolvent debtors. He must annex to and deliver with his petition to the officer to whom it is presented, a schedule containing

First-A full and true account of all his creditors.

Second-The place of residence of each creditor, if known to the debtor, and if not, the fact to be stated.

Third-The sum owing to each creditor, and the nature of each debt or demand, whether arising on written security, on account, or otherwise. Fourth-The true cause and consideration of indebtedness in each case, and the place where the indebtedness accrued.

Fifth-A statement of any existing judgment, mortgage, or collateral or other security for the payment of any such debt.

Sixth-A full and true inventory of all the estate, real, personal, and mixed, in law and equity, of the debtor; of the incumbrances existing thereon, and of all the books, vouchers, and securities relating thereto.

The petitioning debtor, upon making oath that the account of his credi. tors and the inventory of his estate which are annexed to his petition are in all respects just and true; that he has not at any time, or in any manner whatsoever, disposed of or made over any part of his estate for the future benefit of himself, or his family, or in order to defraud any of his creditors; that he has in no instance credited or acknowledged a debt for a greater sum than he honestly and truly owed; and that he has not paid, secured to be paid, or in any way compounded with any of his creditors, with a view fraudulently to take the benefit of the insolvent act; and complying with certain provisions of the law; receives from the officer to whom he applies a discharge from arrest and imprisonment, until the end of the term of the circuit court next to be holden in the county in which the discharge is given, after the expiration of six weeks from the date of the order of discharge. The debtor must then publish in a newspaper for four weeks a notice that he intends to apply to the circuit court of the county in which he is discharged, for a final hearing and discharge. At the time set in the notice, if no opposition is offered, he is finally discharged.

CONVEYANCES.

All instruments of writing, conveying, or affecting real estate situate in this state, executed out of the state, must be acknowledged or proved be. fore some court of the United States, or of a state, or territory, having a seal, or the clerk of any such court. It is in all cases necessary that the grantor should be personally known to the tribunal or officer taking his acknowledgment, (or, if the court be composed of several judges, to one of them,) or should be proven to be the same person described in the convey. ance, by two credible witnesses. The following forms, embracing cases of most usual occurrence, should be accurately followed.

State of

County of

before the

me

Acknowledgment by grantor alone.

SS.

court of clerk of the

Be it remembered, that on this

day of in the county and state aforesaid, (or before court of in the county and state aforesaid,) came A. B., who is personally known to the court (or to me) or (is proved by the testimony of C. D. and E. F. two credible witnesses, examined on oath.) to be the same person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument of writing as a party thereto, and acknowledged the same to be his act and deed for the purposes therein mentioned.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and the seal

[L.S.] of said court the day and year in this behalf above written.

SS.

A. B., Clerk. Acknowledgment by grantor and wife, with relinquishment of dower. "State of County ofBe it remembered, that on this day of before (as above) came A. B. and C. B. his wife, who are both personally known (or as above) to be the same persons whose names are subscribed to the foregoing instrument as parties thereto, and severally acknowledged the same to be their act and deed for the purposes therein mentioned. She, the said C. B., having been made acquainted with the contents of said conveyance, acknowledged, on an examination apart from her said husband, that she executed the said conveyance, and relinquishes her dower in the real estate therein mentioned, freely and without compulsion or undue influence of her said husband. In witness whereof, &c."

Real estate belonging to the wife can be conveyed by deed executed by herself and her husband, and duly acknowledged. The acknowledgment in such case is the same as the second form given above, except that the words, "and relinquishes her dower in the real estate therein mentioned,” must be omitted. This acknowledgment must be taken before a court; if taken before a clerk, it will not answer.

A power of attorney for the execution of a deed conveying or affecting land, must be acknowledged or proved in the same manner as the deed itself would be, if executed by the party.

ASSIGNMENTS.

Until within the past year, assignments which required the creditor to become a party and sign a release within a given time, before he could receive any benefit under them, were considered in this state to be good. In May last, however, the supreme court, after full argument and a labored investigation of the whole subject, declared such assignments to be void against attaching creditors.

AFFIDAVITS.

Affidavits, made out of this state, to be used in any of its courts, must be subscribed by the affiant, and sworn to before a judge of a court of record, whose official character must be attested by a certificate under the hand of the clerk and the seal of the court.

ART. VI. THE SUFFOLK BANK SYSTEM.

WE will briefly state its character, and then also briefly shows its operation, which, we believe, is beneficial both to the banks and to the community at large.

1. Its character.-In behalf of an association of banks in Boston, including all reputed to be sound, the Suffolk Bank receives, at par, the bills of all the banks of New England, on the following conditions, to wit: Each bank shall deposit, in specie, in the Suffolk Bank, a certain sum, on which no interest shall be allowed, which shall remain during the arrangement, and before drawing out which, fifteen days notice shall be given.

The banks shall keep in deposit at the Suffolk Bank, a sum sufficient to meet so much of their circulation as may be redeemed by the Suffolk; or, in technical language, they "shall keep their account good;" and interest shall be calculated, for each day, on whatever balance there may be against the banks; by which mode the Suffolk receives, on their accounts, a rate of interest which is more than six, perhaps seven or eight per cent per annum and if a bank neglects to keep its account good, it shall be liable, at any moment, to be stricken off.

2. Its operation.--Boston, being the centre of business in the New England states, may claim to control the exchanges within these states. The balance of trade, too, between Boston and other places in New England, is unquestionably in favor of Boston. It will be seen, then, that Boston, on the general scale, is not obliged to make remittances to other parts of the states, but that, on the contrary, they must make their remittances to Boston. It follows, therefore, that, while Boston bills are at par all over New England, the bills of other places must be at a discount in Boston, equal, at least, to the expense incurred in getting the bills to the banks whence they are issued for specie or its equivalent, and bringing the funds back to Boston.

The question now presents itself: Is the difference of exchange between Boston and other places in New England less than the expense attending the arrangement with the Suffolk Bank? To settle this question, an appeal should be made to facts. A bank with a capital of $100,000, for instance, is required to deposit in the Suffolk Bank the sum of $3,000, the interest on which, at six per cent per annum, is $180. By a law of Maine-and the law in this respect is pretty uniform in all the New England states— such a bank may put in circulation its own bills to the amount of seventyfive per centum of its capital stock. The average circulation of sound banks, however, having a capital of $100,000, does not exceed $50,000, and the average redemption by the Suffolk Bank is about $10,000 a month, or $120,000 a year. The bank is at the expense and risk of remitting this sum of 120,000 every year in order to redeem its circulation; which expense and risk may be stated at one quarter of one per centum, or the sum of $300. Other expenses, incidental to the arrangement, are, perhops, $120 more; making the whole annual expense of redeeming at the Suffolk Bank, to a bank with a capital of $100,000, the sum of $600. On the other hand, the average rate of exchange, between Boston and other places in New England, being not less than one half of one per cent, will give on $120,000, the precise sum of $600; which amount, in one shape or another, must be borne by the bank not redeeming at the Suf

folk Bank. That it must be borne by the bank may be illustrated in this way: You live in Augusta, for example, and intend to go to Boston to buy goods. You want $2,000. You apply for a discount. The bank pays out its own bills. These bills being at a discount in Boston, you will not carry them there and suffer a loss of $10; so you present them at the bank for Boston bills, or specie; and this shows that a bank must be prepared for such drafts, by keeping a surplus quantity of specie, or Boston funds, constantly on hand. So that, as the question now stands, there is no loss to the bank redeeming at Boston. But the bank is greatly benefited by the arrangement, in its increased circulation, and in not being compelled to keep in its vaults so large an amount of specie as it otherwise would; for the fact of its bills being current in Boston inspires confidence in the soundness of the bank, and its bills are consequently less liable to be presented for specie by their holders.

In regard to the public, the system is safer than redemption at home, as it prevents an undue expansion of issues. A bank disposed to be fraudulent may, indeed, enlarge its issues, and then fail, leaving the public to suffer, whether redeeming at the Suffolk Bank or not; so that it must be admitted, the system furnishes little or no security against fraud. But, with no design to defraud the public, a bank may, nevertheless, very much increase its circulation contrary to good judgment and sound policy; and, while receiving no immediate check from the holders of bills who live at remote distances from the bank, and hold the bills in small parcels, it may yet jeopardize its own interest as well as that of the public. The sum of the matter seems to be this, that, while the expense of redeeming at Boston is no greater than it would be at the counters of the several banks, the safety to the public is greatly increased, and the trouble of looking into the condition of the banks by the people themselves, almost entirely avoided by the adoption of the Suffolk Bank system.

MERCANTILE LAW DEPARTMENT.

RECENT

DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS.* United States District Court.-Mass. District.-Frederick Tudor vs. Ship Eagle and owners.-This was a libel against the ship Eagle, for the value of a cargo of ice shipped on board of her by libellant, in January, 1810, and valued in the bills of lading at between two and three thousand dollars, and destined to the island of Jamaica. It appeared from the evidence that within twentyfour hours after leaving port, the ship sprung a leak, which continued to increase, until, for the purpose of lightening her and getting at the leak, a portion of the cargo was thrown overboard. But the leak still continuing, the ship was put away for Bermuda, where she arrived in about seven days from the time of her departure; and it being impossible to store the ice, or otherwise preserve it, while she underwent repairs, the residue of it was thrown overboard.

In behalf of the libellant, it was contended that there is always an implied warranty on the part of the owners that the vessel is tight, stanch, and seaworthy, and fit for the voyage; and when, without any extraordinary occur

* Reported for the Merchants' Magazine, by A. C. Spooner, Esq., Counseller at Law, Boston, Mass.

rence, she springs a leak immediately after leaving port, it is for the owner to prove her seaworthiness at the inception of the voyage. The defendant maintained that the leak was caused by stress of weather such as might have produced the consequences proved, even to a seaworthy vessel.

It appeared that the Eagle was an eastern built vessel and fifteen years old; and the opinion of experts was given that the log-book did not show any remarkable stress of weather, such as ought not to have been expected at the season of the year in which the voyage was undertaken.

Judge Davis sustained the positions taken by the libellant, and decided that the vessel was unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage, and the libellant was entitled to recover the value of the cargo: and a decree was entered accordingly.

Fairchild et al. vs. Ship Aurelius.-This was a libel for seamen's wages. The libellant Fairchild was second mate, and the other libellant steward of the ship on a voyage from Richmond to Havre, and a final port of discharge in the United States. The ship performed her voyage to Havre, and there cleared for Richmond, Va., but experiencing heavy weather, and having carried away her mainmast, fore and mizzen topmasts, and sustained other damages, put away for Boston, where she arrived on the ninth of June, and the crew all left.

The defence was, that the voyage was not terminated, this being a port of distress merely, and not a port of discharge; and that a libel would not lie until the libellants had performed the contract on their part. The court sustained these positions, held that the libel was premature, and ordered it to be dismissed.

RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

LETTER OF CREDIT-LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS.

D. Carnegie et al. vs. Morrison, Cryder, & Co.-This was an action brought to recover damages for the non-acceptance of bills drawn by the plaintiffs on the defendants pursuant to the following letter of credit:

MESSRS. MORRISON, CRYDER, AND Co., London.

"Boston, March 4, 1837.

Mr. John Bradford, of this city, having requested that a credit may be opened with you for his account in favor of Messrs. D. Carnegie & Co., of Gottenburg, for three thousand pounds sterling, I have assured him that the same will be accorded by you to that amount on the usual terms and conditions. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

For £3000.

FRANCIS J. OLIVER."

Chief-justice Shaw, delivering the opinion of the court, said, it was admitted that Mr. Oliver was the general and authorized agent of the defendants, residing in Massachusetts, and that the letter of credit was given for valuable consideration. Upon this letter of credit the action must be maintained, if at all. The questions then were-1st, whether this letter amounted to a contract, and between whom, and who might avail themselves of it, and against whom; and 2d, by what law its terms were to be construed-that of Massachusetts or that of England. And the court were of opinion that the letter did amount to a contract; and having been made in Massachusetts, by the authorized agent of the defendants here, who assured Mr. Bradford that a credit for £3000 would be opened by them in favor of the plaintiffs, it was to be construed by the laws of Massachusetts, where it was made, and not by those of England, where the defendants reside, or of Sweden, the residence of the plaintiffs.

As to the question, whether the present plaintiffs could maintain an action upon this contract between the agent of the defendants and Mr. Bradford, to which they were not parties, or even privy at the time it was entered into, the court held that the settled law of Massachusetts would establish a priority and imply a promise in favor of the plaintiffs in a case of this nature, the credit having been obtained for their benefit; as in a case where money is paid by