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Sutherland in his work on Statutory Construction (1891), section 226, lays down the rule broadly as follows:
"The legislature has power to pass a general saving statute, which shall have the force and effect to save rights and remedies, except where the repealing statute itself shows that it was not the intention of the legislature that such rights or remedies should be saved. Though one legislature cannot bind future legislatures and each can make its laws prevail against any that exist, and its intention in that regard will be law, yet, as all legislatures are presumed to proceed with a knowledge of existing laws, they may properly be deemed to legislate with such provisions of a general nature in view. In such cases the repealing act is to be considered as limited in its effect and operation in the same manner and to the same extent as if it contained the saving provided by the general law."
Many States have general saving provisions similar to that contained in the Statutory Construction Law, and in all of them the clause seems to have been upheld and given effect when it has come before the court for construction. Legislatures have been held to have legislated in view of the existing general saving clause, and where no provision is made in a repealing act, it has been deemed applicable thereto and as a part thereof. In a recent case in Nebraska, Kleckner v. Turk, 45 Neb. 176; 63 N. W. Repr. 469 (1895), a saving clause similar to that contained in the Statutory Construction Law was before the court for construction in its effect on a subsequent repealing act. The court cited the section of Sutherland on Statutory Construction above referred to and further said:
“The general saving clause of our statute would have saved all action pending under the provisions of the sections repealed if it had not been expressed in or clearly shown by the statute of 1891, that it was not the purpose of the legislature that such pending actions should be preserved," citing Gilleland v. Schuyler, 9 Kans. 569; State v. Boyle, 10 id. 113.
In the case of State v. Boyle, 10 Kans. 113, the chief judge said in reference to a similar statute:
"When the legislature passed said repealing statute, it must be presumed that they had in contemplation every other statute of the State which could in any manner affect repeals, and that they passed such repealing statute with reference to said other statutes. And it must be presumed, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that they intended that the repealing statute should operate to just the extent that the law then in force provided that repealing statutes should operate, and no further."
This case was followed in State v. Crawford, 11 Kans. 32. See, also, In re Tillery, 43 Kans. 188.
In State ex rel. Barton County v. Kansas City, etc., Co., Circuit Court of United States, W. D. of Mo. (1887), 32 Fed. Repr. 722, the
following provision of the Revised Statutes of Missouri was subject to construction:
"No offense committed, and no fine, penalty or forfeiture incurred previous to the time when any statutory provisions shall be repealed shall be affected by such repeal; but the trial and punishment of all such offenses, and the recovery of such fines, penalties and forfeiture shall be had in all respects as if the previous law had remained in force." It was contended that an amendment of a statute worked a repeal of the act amended and released defendant from all liability incurred before such amendment. Judge Brewer (now Justice Brewer) in writing the opinion said:
“It is enough to say that this section must be taken as establishing a general rule controlling all cases in which the repealing act does not clearly express a contrary intent."
See decision in United States v. Keokuk, etc., County District Court for Southern District of Iowa (1891), 45 Fed. Repr. 178, in which a similar provision of the United States statutes was upheld. See, also, State v. Shaffer, 21 Iowa, 486, in which a similar statute was upheld by the State court of Iowa.
A similar statute of Indiana has been repeatedly before the courts of that State for construction and has been uniformly upheld in its application to subsequent repealing acts.
See Bruce v. Cook (1894), 136 Ind. 214; 35 N. E. Repr. 992; Mayne v. Board, 123 Ind. 132; Daggy Township v. Ball (1893), 7 Ind. App. Ct. Rep. 64; 34 N. E. Repr. 246; Sands v. Hatfield (1895), 7 Ind. App. Ct. Rep. 357; 34 N. E. Repr. 246.
In Kentucky, in the case of Commonwealth v. Duff, 87 Ky. 586; 9 S. W. Repr. 816, the court said in reference to a similar statute:
"The purpose of that section, as plainly indicated, is to limit the consequences of repealing statutes, and, as has been held by this court, it should be construed in connection with such statutes, unless contrary to the manifest intent of the legislature," citing Acree v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush, 353; Waddell v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 276.
In Minnesota, a similar saving clause was upheld in Grace v. Donovan, 12 Minn. 580.
In Missouri, a similar statute was upheld in State v. Ross, 416.
In Illinois, a similar statute was upheld in Farmer v. People, 77 Ill. 322; Tipton v. Carrigan, 10 Ill. App. 322.
In New Hampshire, a similar statute was upheld in Lakeman v. Moore, 32 N. H. 410, the court saying:
That it is competent for the legislature by a general law thus to prescribe a rule of construction, to be applied to future acts of repeal, cannot be questioned; and it is undoubtedly equally competent for a subsequent legislature to annul it entirely by a repeal, or to modify it or limit its application, at their pleasure, by enacting to that effect. But in the absence of such statutory enactments, modifying the rule or limiting its
application, all repealing acts subsequently passed must be understood to have been enacted with special reference to it, as the rule thus prescribed for their construction."
See, also. Hall v. Hall, 64 N. H. 295; 9 Atl. Repr. 219, in which various New Hampshire decisions are cited.
In New Jersey, a similar statute was upheld in Wilson v. Herbert, 41 N. J. L. 454.
In Arkansas, a similar statute was before the court for construction in Files v. Fuller, 44 Ark. 273. The court said:
"Any subsequent legislature might make its repealing action operate in pending suits as effectually as if no such statute existed, and the courts are quite free to consider what the subsequent legislature did in fact intend. Still it has kept its place on the statute books, and it is persuasive at least that subsequent legislatures meant to keep in harmony with it, and in their legislation supposed it would go without saying, that, when a repeal was made, all rights in suits pending under the old statute would be preserved.”
§ 32. Effect of repeal and re-enactment.—The provisions of a law repealing a prior law, which are substantial re-enactments of provisions of the prior law, shall be construed as a continuation of such provisions of such prior law, and not as new enactments. If any provision of a law be repealed and, in substance, re-enacted, a reference in any law to such repealed provision shall be deemed a reference to such re-enacted provision. [Thus amended by Laws 1894, chap. 448, taking effect May 3, 1894.]
[As to the continuous character of revision with repeal and re-enactment, see Matter of Prime, 136 N. Y. 347; People ex rel. Ulrich v. Bell, 24 N. Y. St. Repr. 114.]
§ 33. Effect of revision upon laws passed at same session or before revision takes effect.- No provision of any chapter of the revision of the general laws, of which this chapter is a part, shall supersede or repeal by implication any law passed at the same session of the legislature at which any such chapter was enacted, or passed after the enactment of any such chapter and before it shall have taken effect; and an amendatory law passed at such session or at any subsequent session begun before any such chapter takes effect, shall not be deemed repealed, unless specifically designated in the repealing schedule of such chapter.
§ 34. Alterations of titles and headnotes.- If the title of any article or other division of a statute, or the headnote of a section shall be amended or repealed in the body of the statute, or if a new article or other division having a title, or a new section having a new headnote be added to a statute, the corresponding title or headnote, if any, in an abstract of contents at the beginning of the article or other division of the statute shall be deemed to be correspondingly amended or repealed, although there be no express reference thereto.
§ 35. Laws repealed. Of the laws enumerated in the schedule hereto annexed, that portion specified in the last column is repealed.
§ 36. Time of taking effect.- This chapter shall take effect immediately.
Revised Statutes, part I, chapter 8, title 8
Code of Criminal Procedure...
1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
9, 10, 11.
3 and 4.
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REVISERS' NOTE TO TAX LAW.
[This is the note of the statutory revision commission as contained in senate bill 59.]
The original law (Laws 1889, chap. 289), creating a statutory revision commission, expressly provided, among other things, that the commission should prepare and report to the legislature a bill for the consolidation and revision of the general statutes of the State, relating to "the collection and assessment of taxes, and the exemption of property from taxation throughout the State." Accordingly the commissioners appointed pursuant to such law, prepared a consolidation and revision of the tax laws, which, however, was never submitted to the legislature as a whole, either by report of the bill. But in 1892, the commission assisted in the preparation of a bill revising the laws taxing the succession of property, which became chapter 399 of the Laws of 1892, known as the Taxable Transfer Act.
The supplemental supply bill of 1892 (chap. 660) provided for the appointment by the governor of two counsel to "examine the laws of this and other States relating to taxation, and to report to the next legislature before the first day of February, the result of their investigations, with recommendations as to legislation, relating to assessment and taxation in this State."
Messrs. Collin and Fiero were appointed as such counsel and reported to the legislature of 1893 a proposed revision of the tax laws, purporting to cover and supersede all existing statutes relating to taxation. The bill, as reported by the counsel, was introduced in the legislature, but no portion of it became a law, except that relating to sales by the comptroller and by county treasurers for unpaid taxes, which was enacted as chapter 711 of the laws of that year. No formal report was made by the counsel to the legislature of 1894, but chapter 768 of the laws of that year. provided the compensation of such counsel for services rendered during the year 1893.