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A banker doing business under the General Banking Law may be assessed by the name he has adopted in his business -e. g., The Pratt Bank - and the warrant for the collection of the tax issued against such name may be levied upon the property of the banker used in his business. The question whether such banker was taxable in the town or ward in which the assessment was made, cannot be raised to affect the validity of process regular on its face, against the officer executing it. Patchin v. Ritter, 27 Barb. 34 (1858).

When the certificate is not in evidence, the actual location of his banking office will be presumed to have been mentioned therein. Miner v. Village of Fredonia, 27 N. Y. 155 (1863); Metcalf v. Messenger, 46 Barb. 325 (1864). A banker assessed for $3,000 on his banking-house, $25,000 on his capital stock, and $28,000 for personal property, including surplus earnings, from which last item the value of his banking-house was deducted, testified before the assessors that he had no personal property liable to taxation, except the capital of his bank amounting to $25,000; that $10,000 of that amount was in United States bonds, and that his banking-house formed a part of his capital stock. Held, that it was thereupon the duty of the assessors to amend their roll by striking out $10,000 for the amount of the United States bonds; that the amount of valuation on the bankinghouse should be struck out of that on the capital, since it was already assessed on the roll as real estate, and that the whole assessment for personal property should be struck out, since there was nothing in the evidence to justify the assessors in retaining that item against the taxpayer's oath. People ex rel. Raplee v. Reddy, 43 Barb. 539 (1865).

In the case of Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. Y. 610 (1873), Reynolds, Commissioner, in an opinion separate from, but concurring in its conclusions with the opinion of the rest of the court, held that an assessment against a banker for "circulation, notes and profits" was illegal, and made the assessment-roll void on its face, since it appeared to tax the banker for notes issued by himself, and for which he was debtor.

ARTICLE II.

Mode of Assessment.

Section 20. Ascertaining facts for assessment.

21. Preparation of assessment-roll.

22. Assessment of state lands in forest preserve.

23. Banks to make report.

24. Bank shares, how assessed.

25. Individual banker, how assessed.

26. Notice of assessment to bank or banking association.

27. Reports of corporations.

Section 28. Penalty for omission to make statement.

29. Assessment of real property of nonresident.

30. Surveys and maps of nonresident real property.
31. Corporations, how assessed.

32. Assessment of gent, trustee, guardian or executor. 33. Assessment of omitted property.

34. Debts owing to nonresidents of United States, how

assessed.

35. Notice of completion of assessment-roll.

36. Hearing of complaints.

37. Correction and verification of tax-roll.

38. Filing of roll and notice thereof.

39. Assessors to apportion valuation of railroad, telegraph, telephone, or pipe line companies between school districts.

40. Neglect or omission of duty by assessors.

41. Abandonment of lot divisions.

§ 20. Ascertaining facts for assessment.-The assessors in each tax district may, by mutual agreement, divide it into convenient assessment districts not exceeding the number of such assessors. The assessors in each tax district shall annually, between May first and July first, ascertain by diligent inquiry all the property and the names of all the persons taxable therein. [Revisers' Note.. 2. 8., pt. I, chap. 13, tit. II, §§ 71-8; 8th ed., 1096,

without change.]

See Forms, Nos. 1-4.

In collecting material for making an assessment, the assessors may avail themselves of such information by inquiry, and otherwise, as they can obtain. If the party assessed claims that injustice has been done, he may file his affidavit, which the assessors may afterward examine. People ex rel. v. McComber, 24 N. Y. St. Repr. 902; S. C., 7 N. Y. Supp. 71 (1889).

The commissioners in making an assessment are not bound by statements that are contradicted and which they had good reason to disbelieve. People ex rel. Manhattan Ry. Co. v. Barker, 146 N. Y. 304; S. C., 66 N. Y. St. Repr. 658 (1895).

One assessor cannot make an assessment. 7 Cow. 530; 21 Wend. 175; 3 Denio, 598; 4 id. 126; 1 N. Y. 82; People ex rel. Mygatt v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N. Y. 563 (1854).

Where an assessment was made by one assessor only, and neither of the other assessors took part in it, held, that it was void, and afforded no ground for proceedings for contempt in refusing to pay the tax. Metcalf v. Messenger, 46 Barb. 325 (Monroe Gen. T., 1864).

Two of three assessors can make an assessment. Delaware, etc., Canal Co. v. Parker, 45 Hun, 432 (1887).

People ex rel.

Where one of the assessors of a town called in May upon a person then resident therein, and made an entry of his name and the value of his personal estate, and informed him of the fact, and thereafter the person removed to another county, before the assessors completed the assessmentroll, which was in July-held, that the assessment was not made until July, and the assessors had no jurisdiction to make it. Mygatt v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N. Y. 563 (1854).

People ex rel.

It seems that the assessment should be considered as made at the expiration of the time limited for making the inquiry, namely, on the first day of July. Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N. Y. 316 (1857).

A change of residence of the owner, or in the ownership of property, after the first day of July, does not affect the assessment-roll. Any changes the assessors are authorized to make after date are simply to correct mistakes. Boyd v. Gray, 34 How. Pr. 323 (1867).

A person not liable to assessment on the first day of July may recover damages from the assessors for assessing him after that day, for the same year. Clark v. Norton, 49 N. Y. 243 (1872); affirming 3 Lans. 484; Westfall v. Preston, 49 N. Y. 349 (1872).

Although one purchasing property after the completion of the assessment-roll agrees to pay the tax thereon, this confers no jurisdiction upon the assessors to change the assessment to him, nor does it waive the legal rights of the purchaser in this respect. Clark v. Norton, 49 N. Y. 243 (1872); affirming 3 Lans. 484.

Where notice of the completion of an assessment-roll was given July 15, and though plaintiff's name did not appear thereon, nor any memoranda to indicate he was to be assessed, his agent was notified that he would be assessed when information was procured, and afterward his name was placed on the roll with an entry of his property, against the agent's protest,- held, that the assessment was void. Overing v. Foote, 65 N. Y. 263 (1875).

The fact of residence of the executor determines the right of a municipality to assess the personalty of the estate for taxation.

Where it appeared that all the executors had removed from the city and county of New York before the assessment day for a certain year, held, that an assessment of personalty of the estate, by the commissioners of taxes and assessments of said city and county, was void, irrespective of the motives actuating such change of residence. People ex rel. Gould v. Barker (Sp. T.), 14 Misc. 586 (1895).

It is the property and not the person assessed that bears the tax, and a change of ownership or of the condition of the individual relatively

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to the property, after the value is fixed, cannot operate to relieve the property from the tax. McMahon v. Beekman, 65 How. Pr. 127 (1883). A tax assessed on the day of a contract of sale, but not confirmed until after conveyance thereunder, held, not an incumbrance within covenant against incumbrances, nor to be included in an agreement for the adjustment of rents, issue and profits. Id.; Lathers v. Keogh, 39 Hun, 576 (1886).

The action of assessing officers being judicial in character, their judgments in cases within their jurisdiction are not open to collateral attack, and can only be collected by some mode pointed out by statute. Stanley v. Albany County, 121 U. S. 535.

The errors of assessors acting within their jurisdiction can only he corrected by certiorari, and if the sum fixed upon is just, it is immaterial how they reached their conclusion. Litchfield v. Brooklyn, 13 Misc. 693; S. C., 69 N. Y. St. Repr. 171; 34 N. Y. Supp. 1090 (1895).

The Penal Code, § 485, prescribes the penalty for false statement to a tax officer.

§ 21. Preparation of assessment-roll.- They shall prepare an assessment-roll containing five separate columns, and shall, according to the best information in their power, set down: 1. In the first column the names of all taxable persons in the tax district.

A tax was assessed to Harry D. Van Voorhis while the real name of the person intended was William H., he being familiarly known as Henry. Held, that the designation was sufficient. Van Voorhis v. Budd, 39 Barb. 479 (1863).

Where the appellant was the only person bearing the name assessed in the county, and was confessedly the owner of the property, the addition of the letters "est" to his name on the roll was held not to invalidate the assessment. Matter of Hartshorn, 44 N. Y. St. Repr. 16; S. C., 17 N. Y. Supp. 567 (1892).

An assessment of a trust estate against the name of one of the trustees only, adding the name of the other and the words "executors and trustees," and making the name of trustee "Henry" instead of "Harry P.". held valid, and to be the proper subject of amendment by the assessors by striking out the word "executors and correcting the name. People ex rel. Pike v. Barker, 86 Hun, 283; affirming 11 Misc. 262; S. C., 65 N. Y. St. Repr. 810; 32 N. Y. Supp. 485 (1895).

An assessment for personal property against the heirs of a deceased person, without naming them, does not follow the statutes, and is void. Village of Sandy Hill v. Akin, 77 Hun, 537; S. C., 60 N. Y. St. Repr. 396; 28 N. Y. Supp. 889 (189).

Where the owner to whom property was assessed died July 11, though the roll was not verified till September - held, that the assessment was to the proper owner. O'Donnell v. McIntyre, 37 Hun, 615 (1885).

The entry in the record of assessment for personal taxes, of the name of a lunatic, with the addition of the name and address of his committee made in the place in the list where the entry would probably be, if no commission of lunacy had been issued - held, sufficient to show an assessment upon the lunatic and not upon the committee, and that it was not invalidated by the additional name and address. People ex rel. U. S. Trust Co. v. Barker, 50 N. Y. St. Repr. 741; S. C., 21 N. Y. Supp. 704; affirmed in 137 N. Y. 631 (1893).

64

An assessment for personal property against an executor by name as executor of estate of," etc., is not an assessment against the executor as such, and is valid. McLean v. Horn, 42 N. Y. St. Repr. 329; S. C., 17 N. Y. Supp. 119 (1891). A misnomer of one of several administrators held, not to invalidate the assessment. Id.

In New York city it is not essential to validity of a tax upon land that the name of the owner should be inserted in the assessment-list, and the only effect of omitting it, or of inserting the name of one who is not the owner, is to deprive the city of the right to collect the tax from the owner personally or by distress of goods and chattels, etc., and to confine its remedy to the enforcement of its lien. Haight v. Mayor, 99 N. Y. 280 (1885).

Assessors cannot acquire jurisdiction by deciding that they have it. Their decision upon the question of the residence of a property owner is subject to review, and when the evidence thereon is conflicting, it is a question of fact for a jury. Dorn v. Backer, 61 N. Y. 261 (1874); reversing 61 Barb. 597.

The General Term had held in this last-mentioned case that the decision of the assessors as to the place of residence of a person owning real estate was a judicial duty, and that even a palpable error in the performance of it would not subject them to damages. The General Term in this decision followed Brown v. Smith, 24 Barb. 420 (1957), the doctrine of which was afterward accepted in Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N. Y. 238 (1866). In the earlier case of Prosser v. Secor, 5 Barb. 607, decided in 1849, assessors had been held liable for assessing a person not subject to tax, and this liability the Court of Appeals, in Dorn v. Backer, 61 N. Y. 261, recognizes in connection with the assessors' determination as to residence of a landowner.

2. In the second column the quantity of real property taxable to each person, with a statement thereof in such form as the commissioners of taxes shall prescribe.

The owner of real estate at the time of the completion of the roll is liable for the tax, although he conveys before the tax is laid by the board of supervisors. Rundell v. Lakey, 40 N. Y. 513 (1869); Everson v. City of Syracuse, 29 Hun, 458 (1883); reversed on another ground in 100 N. Y. 577. An assessment of lands to the estate of a deceased person is irregular

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