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Laws of 1869 (chap. 875, § 2) provided that the real estate of that institution, except buildings actually used for hospital purposes, shall be liable to taxation. Held, that the earlier statute did not constitute a contract but was a spontaneous concession, subject to repeal or modification. People ex rel. Davies v. Commissioners of Taxes of New York, 47 N. Y. 501 (1872).

A statute exempting the defendant company from taxation held repealable. Hewitt v. N. Y. & Oswego Mid. R. R. Co., 12 Bl. 452. See, also, Stevens v. N. Y. & Oswego Mid. R. R. Co., 13 Blatchf. 104 (1875).

Where the legislature directs a tax to pay claims not recoverable by action, nor a public charge, but founded only in equity and justice, it vests no absolute right in the claimants, and when no condition is imposed upon them and no remuneration is required of them for the concession, it does not have the constitutional sanction of a contract, and before the money is raised and paid over, a repeal annuls it. Feople ex rel. Canajoharie Nat. Bank v. Supervisors of Montgomery, 67 N. Y. 109 (1876).

Laws of 1873 (chap. 119) do not affect any contract. People ex rel. Witherbee Supervisors, 70 N. Y. 234 (1877).

The provisions of the Law of 1885 (chap. 405), directing the registrar of arrears in the city of Brooklyn, within six months after the passage of the act, to cancel all sales for taxes made more than eight years and upon which no leases shall have been given,- held, not to impair the obligation of any contract with the holders of certificates of sales, but to be merely a short statute of limitations, and as such reasonable. Wheeler v.

Jackson, 41 Hun, 410 (1886).

The omission of the exemption granted to members of the National Guard by the Laws of 1870 (chap. 80, § 253), from the section amending it (Laws of 1875, chap. 223, § 59), effects a repeal of the provision. People ex rel. Sears v. Assessors of Brooklyn, 84 N. Y. 610; affirming 18 Hun, 386 (1881).

Such repeal does not infringe the Constitution, since no contract relation existed between the State and any member who had enlisted prior to the repeal. Id. And see People ex rel. Cunningham v. Roper, 35 N. Y. 629 (1866).

An exemption from taxation granted to a corporation, held not to pass by the mortgage of its charter and works or to be included in the transfer of the franchise to be a corporation to the mortgagees or purchasers at a judicial sale, and hence taxation of the new corporation did not impair the obligation of any contract. Memphis R. R. Co. v. Commrs., 112 U. S. 609 (1884). An exemption contained in the charter of a railroad company,- held, not to pass to a consolidated corporation. St. Louis, Iron Mountain, etc., Ry. Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465 (1885).

A law of a State may authorize a debtor to produce the obligations of his creditor and use them as set-off for his own debt, and such a law can be liable to no impeachment as divesting vested rights or impairing the obligation of contracts. So held in respect to the extinguishment of

taxes by the set-off of municipal bonds. Amy v. Shelby County Taxing District, 114 U. S. 387 (1885).

The following cases constitute the Virginia Coupon Tax Cases of 1885: Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270; White v. Greenhow, id. 307; Chatlin v. Taylor, id. 309; Allen v. B. & C. R. R. Co., id. 311; Carter v. Greenhow, id. 317; Pleasants v. Greenhow, id. 323; Marye v. Parsons, id. 325.

A special exemption from taxation held personal, and not to pass to the purchasers of the railroad under foreclosure, and a statute subjecting the property of the plaintiff in error to taxation - held, not to impair the obligation of any contract. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Miller, 114 U. S. 176 (1885).

See, also, the following cases constituting the Virginia Coupon Tax Cases of 1886: Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550; Chailin v. Taylor, id. 567; Royall v. Virginia, id. 572; Sands v. Edmunds, id. 585; Willis v. Miller, 29 Fed. Repr. 238; Strickler v. Yager, id. 244. And see Vicksburgh, S. & P. R. R. Co. v. Dennis, id. 665.

Exemption from taxation being a special privilege granted by the government to an individual, either in goods or as an appurtenant to the freehold, is a franchise, and acquiescence in actual taxation, or an actual invasion, of the franchise, year by year for over thirty years, will be regarded as presumptive evidence of its abandonment or surrender, so that there is no impairment of the obligation of the original contract of exemption. Given v. Wright, 117 U. S. 648 (1886).

An act of the State of Louisiana, held void as impairing the obligation of a contract, if it should be construed as imposing any other taxes upon a company than those provided by its charter. A tax upon the shares of stockholders, held, on the facts, substantially a tax on the company itself. New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265 (1886). See, also, Chicago & Kansas City R. R. Co. v. Guffey, 122 id. 561 (1887).

A statute in relation to the collection of a tax which is not the legal equivalent of a prior statute on the same subject, is inoperative for the purpose of collecting a tax to pay a judgment against a municipal corporation, recovered prior to the passage of the subsequent statute, and is waconstitutional. Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284 (1887).

Art. I, § 10: "2. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties or imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress.

"No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war, in time of peace, enter

into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay."

Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U. S.) 283 (1849), cited, supra, art. I, § 8; People v. Moring, 3 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 539 (1867), cited, supra. art. I. § 8; Henderson V. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259 (1875), cited, supra, art. 1. § 8. See, also, Cook v. l'ennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566 (1878), cited above, under art. I. § 8; People ex rel. Haneman v. Tax Commrs., 10 Hun 255 (1877); S. C., 73 N. Y. 607 (1878).

Laws of 1867, chapter 256, and Laws of 1871, chapter 205, in effect claim a contribution from the owners of a vessel for the privilege of arriving and departing from this port, and are unconstitutional, as laying a duty on tonnage. Cole v. Johnson, 10 Daly, 258 (1881); People v. National Fire Ins. Co., 27 Hun, 188 (1882), cited, supra, art. I, § 8. Laws of 1881, chapter 427, and Laws of 1881, chapter 432, held not inspection laws within the meaning of this section of the Constitution. People v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59 (1882); Brown v. Houston, 114 id. 622 (1885), cited above, art. I, § 8; Morgan S. S. Co. v. Louisiana, 118 id. 455 (1886), cited above, art. I, § 8.

Art. IV, § 2: "1. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

Laws of 1837, chapter 30; Laws of 1849, chapter 178; Laws of 1857, chapter 548, requiring the agent of foreign fire insurance companies to pay certain taxes, are not in contravention of this provision. Fire Department v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith, 440 (1854).

The equal"immunities and privileges" secured to the "citizens of each State," in the "several States," do not demand that the property of the resident citizen should pay for the protection afforded by the laws to the property of the nonresident. L. 1855, chap. 37. The act taxing nonresidents on capital invested in business in this State, held constitutional. Duer v. Small, 17 How. Pr. 201 (1859); 4 Blatchf. 263 (1859). See, also, Brown v. Houston, 114, U. S. 633 (1885).

Amendments, Art. V : "No person shall

be

deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."

Laws of 1873, chapter 119, does not deprive any town of its property without due process of law. People ex rel. Witherbee v. Supervisors, 70 N. Y. 228 (1877).

The general grant of legislative power in the Constitution of a State does not enable the legislature, in its exercise either of the right of eminent domain, or of the right of taxation, to take private property,

without the owner's consent, for any but a public object. A Missouri statute, authorizing an issue of bonds to a private manufacturing company, held invalid. Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1 (1885).

Commitment for failure to pay a tax, not resorted to until other means of collection have failed, and then only upon a showing of property possessed, not accessible to levy, bat enabling the owner to pay if he chooses, is not in conflict with the constitutional provisions as to due process of law. Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660.

A State statute authorizing the assessments and collection of a tax, which provides for due notice to all persons interested, and a proper mode of contesting the tax in a court, does not deprive persons of property without due process of law. Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316.

When the law provides for a mode of confirming or contesting assessment of taxes, by a board of revision, whose action can be reviewed on certiorari, with due notice to the person assessed, and for a review, the assessment does not deprive the owner of his property without due process of law. Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660.

The process of taxation does not require the same kind of notice as is required in a suit at law, it involves no violation of due process of law, when it is executed according to customary form and established usages. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232.

In tax proceedings, the notice is sufficient to constitute due process of law where the statute names the time and place for the meeting of the assessing board. R. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421.

The constitutional provision as to due process of law has no application to the levy of taxes by State officers contrary to an invalid provision of a statute attempting to exempt it. Little Rock, etc., R. R. Co. v. Worthen, 120 N. Y. 97.

Amendments, Art. XIV, § 1:

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or inimunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

A law directing a proceeding by which one is deprived of his property, whether the proceeding be judicial or administrative, whether by taking the property or imposing a charge upon it, must provide some notice to the owner and opportunity to be heard, to be within due process of law. County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 13 Fed. Repr. 722 (1882); County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 18 id. 385 (1883).

The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in declaring that no State shall deny to any person the equal protection of the laws, imposes a limitation upon the exercise of the powers of the

State concerning taxation. County San Mateo v. Southern Pacific Ry., above.

Under that amendment, any person can resort to the courts of the United States to secure redress from unequal taxation. Id.

This rule extends to corporations. Id.

Uniformity in taxation requires uniformity in the mode of assessment as well as in the rate of percentage charged. Id.

Allegations in a complaint, praying for an injunction against the collection of a tax, to the effect that the complainants are taxed for real property subject to mortgage without deducting the amount of the mortgage; that they are taxed for personal property without deducting the amount of their debts; that they are taxed for real property which they hold as lessees under the State or city, while individual tenants or lessees are not so taxed; that they are taxed for State purposes in cases where individuals are not so taxed; and that a discrimination is made against the complainants, and in favor of corporations, by the State of New York, in that telegraph corporations, gas companies, steamheating corporations and surface railway corporations are not taxed in the same manner or upon the same principle for their property imbedded in or resting upon the streets of the city-held not to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the United States courts under the fourteen h amendment to the Federal Constitution, nor to take it out of the methods of relief provided by the State. Manhattan Ry. Co. v. Mayor, etc., New York, 18 Fed. Repr. 195 (1883).

State legislatures may impose double taxes or burdens beyond the financial capacity of the classes taxed, without interference by the courts, where the rate is equitably apportioned upon each of the classes who stand in similar relations to each other. People v. Home Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 328 (1883). See 119 U. S. 129.

Proceedings to raise public revenue by levying and collecting taxes are not necessarily judicial, and "due process of law," as applied to that subject, does not imply or require such notice and hearing as are essential to the validity of proceedings and judgments of judicial proceedings. Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321 (1885).

A State statute which gives notice of a proposed assessment by requiring the owner to present a statement of property, with his estimate of its value, to a designated official, which fixes time and place for public sessions of other officials at which such statement and estimates are to be considered, and the official valuation made, when and where the party interested has a right to be present and to be heard, and which affords him opportunity, in a suit to collect the tax, to judicially contest the validity of the proceeding, does not necessarily deprive him of his property without due process of law, within the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Id.

Where a State statute creates different methods of ascertaining values, and of appeal for different classes of property, but provides for the im

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