Rationality and ReasoningPsychology Press, 1996 - 179 halaman This book addresses an apparent paradox in the psychology of thinking. On the one hand, human beings are a highly successful species; on the other, intelligent adults are known to exhibit numerous errors and biases in laboratory studies of reasoning and decision making. There has been much debate among both philosophers and psychologists about the implications of such studies for human rationality. The authors argue that this debate is marked by a confusion between two distinct notions: (a) personal rationality (rationality[subscript 1]) the degree to which people reliably achieve their individual goals, and (b) impersonal rationality (rationality[subscript 2]) the degree to which people perform inferences or act for reasons sanctioned by some abstract normative standard, like formal logic or probability theory. Evans and Over argue that people have a high degree of rationality[subscript 1] but only a limited capacity for rationality[subscript 2]. The book reinterprets the psychological literature on reasoning and decision making, showing that many normative errors, by abstract standards, reflect the operation of processes that would normally help to achieve ordinary goals. Topics discussed include relevance effects in reasoning and decision making, the influence of prior beliefs on thinking, and the argument that apparently non-logical reasoning can reflect efficient decision making. The authors also discuss the problem of deductive competence whether people have it, and what mechanism can account for it. As the book progresses, increasing emphasis is given to the authors' dual process theory of thinking, in which a distinction between tacit and explicit cognitive systems is developed. It is argued that much of human capacity for rationality[subscript 1] is invested in tacit cognitive processes which reflect both innate mechanisms and biologically constrained learning. However, the authors go on to argue that human beings also possess an explicit thinking system which underlies their unique, if limited, capacity to be rational. |
Isi
Rationality in reasoning | 1 |
Personal goals utility and probability | 25 |
Relevance rationality and tacit processing | 45 |
The case of | 71 |
Prior belief | 95 |
Deductive competence | 119 |
A dual process theory of thinking | 141 |
References | 163 |
| 173 | |
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abstract achieve actions analysis antecedent argued argument asked base rate base rate fallacy Bayesian behaviour belief bias biases Chapter choices choose cognitive conclusion conditional reasoning confirmation bias conscious consider counter-examples deductive competence deductive reasoning deontic selection tasks discussed dual process theory epistemic utility evidence example experimental experiments explicit reasoning explicitly false falsifying focus focusing given goals heuristic human hypothesis implicit learning implicit processes indicative selection task inference rules instructions Kahneman Manktelow matching bias mental logic mental models model theory modus ponens modus tollens Mynatt negation Nisbett normative decision theory normative system normative theory not-q card Oaksford and Chater outcomes people's pragmatic preconscious preferences premises principles prior belief probability judgements probability theory problem rational2 rationality2 ravens reasoning and decision relevance Shafir Sperber subjective expected utility subjective probability tacit processes theoretical thought true truth table turn Tversky valid violation Wason selection task