Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach
Through an effective blend of analysis and examples this text integrates the game theory revolution with the traditional understanding of imperfectly competitive markets. The book’s focus is on strategic competition and how firms can shelter their market power and economic profits from competitors. This focus establishes the intellectual foundation for determining business practices that warrant antitrust examination and prohibition and underlines recent activist antitrust policy. The author’s stress an integrated understanding of industrial organization and the development of students’ analytical abilities.
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advertising agreement antitrust assume average cost barriers to entry behavior Bertrand best-response function brand buyers capacity Chapter collusive competition competitors consider consumer surplus contract cost function Cournot equilibrium deadweight loss demand curve deter entry determine discount dominant firm economic profits economies of scale effect efficient elasticity of demand entrant entry barriers entry deterrence equal equilibrium price example factors Figure firm 1's firm's fixed costs incentive increase Industrial Organization innovation input investment Journal of Economics Lerner index marginal cost marginal revenue market power market share maximize merger monopolist Nash equilibrium natural monopoly number of firms oligopoly optimal outcome output patent payoff period player postentry predatory pricing price discrimination product differentiation profit-maximizing quantity quasi-rents Ramsey pricing rate of return reduce regulation regulatory requires result retail rival strategy subgame substitutes supplier supply Suppose theory total surplus trade two-part tariff unit variable zero